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ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Scott L. Sillimant
I. Introduction
With pretrial hearings for several detainees underway at Guantanamo
Bay, and the prospect for full trials before military commissions' starting
either late this year or early in 2005, this little-understood option for
prosecuting terrorists has become the focus of intense debate within this
country and abroad, even becoming an election year issue for the
presidential contenders. 2
Many have suggested that the military
commission procedures should have grafted in more of the due process
protections afforded in courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 3 the criminal justice system created by Congress to govern the
conduct of our own service men and women,4 even though the commissions
will be used only for non-resident aliens. Others question whether the
t A.B. 1965, J.D. 1968, University of North Carolina. After serving for 25 years as a
uniformed judge advocate in the United States Air Force, Professor Silliman retired in the
grade of colonel in 1993 and joined the faculty at Duke University School of Law where he
is a Professor of the Practice of Law as well as Executive Director of Duke's Center on Law,
Ethics and National Security.
I Although many commentators have referred to the proceedings at Guantanamo Bay
as
military "tribunals", the more correct term is military "commissions" since military tribunals
encompass not only commissions, but also courts-martial, provost courts, and courts of
inquiry. See 10 U.S.C.S. § 821 (2004).
2 Senator Kerry has indicated that he would "scrap the military
commissions created by
President Bush to try suspected al Qaeda and Taliban fighters detained at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, and would instead establish a new system modeled on military courts-martial." Glenn
Kessler, Kerry Would Drop Detainee Commissions, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2004, at A07.
'See 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 801-946 (2004).
4 See, e.g., American Bar Association Resolution 8C, contained in The Summary of
Action Taken by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, Karen J. Mathis,
Chair, Presiding, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 4-5, 2002; and AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, Report and Recommendations on

Military Commissions (hereinafter ABA Task Force); January 4, 2002 available at
http://abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf. Regrettably, some, even our highest officials, tend
to confuse military commissions and courts-martial. White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzalez was the featured speaker at an ABA-sponsored luncheon in Washington DC on
November 30, 2001. When asked by a member of the press how he would respond to
allegations regarding the unfairness of the military commissions, he responded that there
was a rich 50 year history of military justice which should disprove that allegation. Military
justice is, of course, the statutory system of justice under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and quite distinct from the presidentially created military commission system.
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proceedings at Guantanamo Bay should comply, even minimally, with
constitutional requirements, and most commentators have assailed the lack
of any type ofjudicial review of military commission convictions.5
But what are these military commissions, and from where do they
derive their authority? This brief note is intended only as a primer on the
current military commission system for those not familiar with it,
highlighting some of the key issues at the center of the debate.
H. Early Commissions
This country has a rich historical tradition of trying by military
commission those accused of violations of the law of war when the civil
courts are either not open or considered not suitable.6 One of the first was
the trial of Major John Andre, Adjutant-General to the British Army, in
1780 on a charge that he had crossed the battle lines to meet with Benedict
Arnold and had been captured in disguise and while using an assumed
name. 7 Many others were conducted during the Revolutionary War period,
as well as during the Mexican and Civil Wars.8 Two of the most recent,
and perhaps of greatest relevance to an analysis of the Guantanamo Bay
commissions, were conducted during World War II. In the first, after the
declaration of war between the United States and Germany, eight Nazi
saboteurs disembarked from two German submarines at Amagansett Beach
on Long Island and at Ponte Vedra Beach in Florida, respectively, and
proceeded to bury their uniforms and don civilian attire. 9 They thereafter
set about to sabotage war industries and war facilities in this country, but
were quickly captured and prosecuted by a military commission convened
by President Roosevelt and held in Washington DC. 10 All eight were

5 Convictions by military commissions are reviewed by a Review Panel consisting of

three military officers (including civilians specially appointed as military officers for that
purpose), one of which must have experience as a judge. The Review Panel is empowered
to forward the case to the Secretary of Defense with a recommendation as to disposition or
to return the case to the Appointing Authority (the official who appoints the commission) for
further proceedings, provided that a majority of the Review Panel has formed a definite and
firm conviction that a material error of law occurred. DEP'T OF DEF. MILrrARY COMMISSION
ORDER No. 1, para. 6(H)(4), Mar. 21, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
commissions.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
6 Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 205 (2d ed. 2004).
7 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 41 n. 14 (1942).
8 See id. at 32 n. 10.
9

Id. at 21.
10Louis FISHER, NAZI

SABoTEURs ON TRIAL 25, 35, & 50

(2003).
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convicted, and six of the eight were electrocuted only five days after being
sentenced to death by the commission."
The Supreme Court, in the context of reviewing the district court's
denial of petitions for habeas corpus, issued a carefully limited ruling
affirming the government's power to detain and try the saboteurs by
military commission under the circumstances presented. 12 In the second,
after the surrender of Germany but before the surrender of Japan, twentyone German nationals were convicted by a military commission sitting in
China of violating the laws of war by collecting and furnishing to the
Japanese armed forces intelligence concerning American forces and their
movements.
They were sentenced to prison terms and relocated to
occupied Germany to serve them. ' 4 The Supreme Court, again in the
context of a district court denial of petitions for habeas corpus, held that
enemy aliens, who at no relevant time and in no stage of their captivity had
been within our territorial jurisdiction, had no constitutional right to access
our courts. 15

The Court also reiterated that a military commission is a

lawful tribunal to adjudge enemy offenses against the laws of war.' 6
The military commissions which gave rise to both the Quirin and
Eisentragercases, as well as the one used to prosecute General Yamashita,
the Commanding General of the Imperial Japanese Army in the
Philippines, 17 were war courts, one of three types of military
commissions. The other two types of commissions are martial law courts,
such as those used during the Civil War in Ex parte Milligan'9 and in World
War II in Duncan v. Kahanamoku;20 and occupation courts, such as the one
" Id. at 79.
12 "We have no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of
the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war. It is enough
that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were plainly within those boundaries, and
were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies who,
with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered or after entry remained in
our territory without uniform-an offense against the law of war. We hold only that those
particular acts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes
to be tried by military commission". Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46.
13Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950).
14 id.
'" Id.

at 777-778.

See generally id. at 785.
17In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5 (1946).
18 Maj. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial:A Brief
Discussion of the Constitutionaland JurisdictionalDistinctions Between the Two Courts,
ARMY LAW., Mar. 2002, at 19, 37.
'9 71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall.) (1866).
16

'0 327 U.S. 304, 307 (1946).
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used in Madsen v. Kinsella21 for the trial of an American dependent wife
charged with murdering her husband in occupied Germany in violation of
the German criminal code. The military commissions currently being used
at Guantanamo Bay are of the first type, war courts.
IlI. Who Can Authorize Military Commissions: The Presidentor Congress?
One of the principal points of contention immediately following the
promulgation of President Bush's Military Order of November 13, 2001
authorizing military commissions 22 was whether he had the authority,
23
I believe he did, and
without specific congressional approval, to do SO.
that it flowed directly from his constitutional authority as Commander-inChief.24 It is significant that the Military Order was styled exactly as such-a
military order-rather than the much more commonly used title executive
order. Further, the first paragraph of the order clearly emphasizes the
President's authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, as
25
As to the statutory
against the later references to supporting statutes.
26 only one of the three could arguably be construed as even
references cited,
suggesting a congressional grant of authority to the President to authorize
commissions, but a closer analysis renders that claim dubious.
In the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution of
September 18, 2001, the first law cited, the key operative language is
21 343 U.S. 341, 343 (1952).

Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001) (hereinafter Military Order).
23 See, e.g., Department OfJustice Oversight: PreservingOurFreedoms While Defending
22

h
Against Terrorism: Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary 107' Cong. 107-74 (2001)
(statements of Scott Silliman, Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics, and National
Security, Duke University School of Law and Neal Katyal, Visiting Professor Yale Law
School, Professor of Law, Georgetown University); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 3 249 (2002).
24 See U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 1. Colonel Winthrop's respected commentary gives

support to this argument: "The commission is simply an instrumentality for the more
efficient execution of the war powers vested in Congress and the power vested in the
President as Commander-in-Chief in war. In some instances.. .Congress has specifically
recognized the military commission as a proper war-court, and in terms provided for the trial
thereby of certain offences. In general, however, it has left it to the President, and the
military commanders representing him, to employ the commission, as occasion may require,
for the investigation and punishment of violations of the laws of war and other offenses not
cognizable by court-martial." WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 831
(2d ed., 1920).
25 Military Order, supra., note 22.
26 See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001); 10 U.S.C.S. § 821 (2004); 10 U.S.C.S. § 836 (2004).
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contained in Section 2(a) which clearly authorizes the President to use
force,2 7 but does not go so far as to empower him to conduct military
commissions to prosecute those captured. 2" The third statutory reference,
Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is simply a general
delegation of authority to the President to prescribe trial procedures,
including modes of proof, for courts-martial, military commissions, and
other military tribunals and states that he should, "so far as he considers
practicable, apply the principles of law and rules of evidence" generally
used in criminal cases in federal districtcourts. 29 Rather than citing this
provision as empowering him to authorize military commissions, the
President clearly intended it to refer to his decision that use of those
principles of law and rules of evidence was not practicable "given the
danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international
terrorism. ''3° The second cited law, Article 21 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 3 1 is the one which has drawn the most attention with regard
to the President's authorization of military commissions.
Under the Constitution, Congress was granted authority to make rules
for the government of the land and naval forces 32 and it did so most recently
through enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,33 of which
"That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Sept 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons." 107 Pub. L. 40, 115 Stat. 224, at 2(a).
28In the Supreme Court decision regarding a petition for
habeas corpus filed on behalf of
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen designated by the President as an "enemy combatant" and
held without charges or access to counsel for over two years at a naval brig in Charleston,
South Carolina, five justices (O'Connor, Rehnquist, Kennedy and Breyer for the majority,
Souter and Ginsburg concurring, and Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas in dissent) believed that
the Resolution was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the non-detention statute, 18
U.S.C. § 4001(a), for purposes of legitimizing Hamdi's detention under the circumstances,
but even in so holding the Court ruled that he had the right to challenge that detention before
a "neutral decisionmaker". Since Hamdi, as an American citizen, was outside the parameters
of the Military Order, the Court obviously did not address the issue of whether the
Resolution could be construed to authorize anything other than detention. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2639-2640, 2678 (2004).
'9 10 U.S.C.S. § 836 (2004).
30 Military Order, supra note 22, at § l(f).
3110 U.S.C.S. § 821 (2004).
27

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 14. This clause is distinctly different in purpose from
article I,
§ 8, clause 10 which gives Congress the authority to define and punish offenses against the
law of nations, of which the law of war is a subset. See note 42, infra, and accompanying
text.
33See 10 U.S.C.S. §§ 801-946 (2004).
32

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 36:529

Article 21 is a part. That section of the military code, entitled "Jurisdiction
of courts-martial not exclusive," states:
"The provisions of this chapter [ ]conferring jurisdiction upon courtsmartial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders and
offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. 34
This section is virtually identical in wording to its predecessor, Article
15 of the Articles of War, which, when newly enacted in 1916, was the
subject of hearings in the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs. The
testimony of Army Brigadier General Crowder, then Judge Advocate
General of the Army, before the subcommittee is instructive:
"General Crowder: Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2
as subject to military law a number of persons who are also subject to trial
by military commission. A military commission is our common-law war
court. It has no statutory existence, though it is recognized by statute law.
As long as the articles embraced them in the designation "persons subject
to military law," and provided that they might be tried by court-martial, I
was afraid that, having made a special provision for their trial by court-

martial, it might be held that the provision operated to exclude trials by
military commission and other war courts; so this new article was
introduced... It just saves to these war courts the jurisdiction they now
have and makes it a concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial, so that the
military commander in the field in time of war will be at liberty to employ

either form of court that happens to be convenient... Yet, as I have said,
these war courts never have been formally authorized by statute.
Senator Colt. They grew out of usage and necessity?
Gen. Crowder. Out of usage and necessity. I thought it was just as

well, as inquiries would arise, to put this information in the record."
(Emphasis added).36

34 10 U.S.C.

§ 821 (2005).
15. NOT ExcLusIvE. - The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon
courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals." Articles of War, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 650, 653 (1916).
36
Preparednessfor National Defense: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Military
th
Affairs, 1916 Leg., 64 Cong. 64-1 (1916) (Testimony of Brigadier General Enoch H.
Crowder, United States Army, Judge Advocate General of the Army, Feb. 7, 1916).
35"Art

2004]

ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS

What is clear from General Crowder's testimony is that Article 15 of
the Articles of War (and its successor, Article 21 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice) was not meant to constitute any grant of authority from
Congress to the President with regard to military commissions. Rather, it
was meant only to ensure that military commissions, predicated not upon a
specific statutory grant but rather upon historical usage under the
President's Commander-in-Chief authority, were not divested of their
jurisdiction because of the creation of a new court-martial system which
would have overlapping jurisdictional coverage. The word "recognized" is
key to an accurate understanding because it implies only acknowledgment,
not establishment. Interestingly, the wording from Chief Justice Stone's
opinion in Quirin is similar37 in discussing the legal predicate for President
Roosevelt's executive order authorizing a military commission for the Nazi
saboteurs.
It is worth remembering that Roosevelt's executive order was issued
incident to a congressionally declared war in which the president's
authority as Commander-in-Chief was at its maximum, 38 and therefore the
Court's discussion of presidential power as supported by congressional
mandate vis-a-vis military commissions must be considered more broadly
than just with reference to Article 15 of the Articles of War.39 Further,
Quirin specifically left open the question of whether the President alone
had authority to authorize military commissions, quite apart from any act of
Congress,4 0 but the Supreme Court later answered that in the affirmative in
Madsen v. Kinsella4l in the context of its discussion of the legality of an
occupation court in Germany.
37 "But the Articles also recognize the 'military commission' appointed
by military
command as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law
of war not ordinarily tried by court martial." (Emphasis added). Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41.
38 Cf. Justice Jackson's first category in his discussion of the balance of presidential
powers in the Steel Seizure case; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952).
39 "The Constitution thus invests the President, as Commander in Chief, with
the power to
wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry into effect all laws passed by Congress
for the conduct of the war and for the government and regulation of the Armed Forces, and
all the laws defining and punishing offenses against the law of nations, including those
which pertain to the conduct of war". Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26.
40 "It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the President as
Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without the
support of Congressional legislation." Id., at 29.
41 "In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears that,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, he may, in time of war,
establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, and of
tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied by Armed Forces of the
United States." Madsen, 343 U.S. 341, 348.
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Since Congress has not attempted to legislate with regard to military
commissions following President Bush's Military Order,4 and since the
only applicable statute (Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice)
simply recognizes the previously existing jurisdiction of military
commissions under common law, President Bush, as Commander-in-Chief,
has clear authority to authorize the use of commissions, as he did on
November 13, 2001.
IV. Proceduresfor Military Commissions At GuantanamoBay
The Military Order, standing alone, reflects a paucity of due process,
whether measured by domestic or international law standards; 43 but some
four months later, perhaps in response to widespread criticism, the
Secretary of Defense promulgated a much more detailed set of procedures
which included many of the protections afforded in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. 44 Significant differences still exist, though, between those
used in military commissions and those used in courts-martial, notably the
Although article I, § 8, clause 10 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
nations, it has done so with regard to the latter in a very limited manner, most notably in the
War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.CS. § 2441, which makes punishable in our federal courts
violations of a number of international treaties wherever the perpetrator or the victim is a
member of our armed forces or a national of the United States. Congress has clearly not
used this clause, which would be the more appropriate grant of authority, to legislate in the
area of military commissions.
43 Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337,
338 n.7 & 9 (2002). The Order provides only for (a) a full and fair trial, with the military
commission sitting as triers of both fact and law; (b) admission of evidence that would have
probative value to a reasonable person; (c) procedures for safeguarding classified
information; (d) provision for the designation of prosecution and defense attorneys; (e)
conviction and sentencing upon the concurrence of only two-thirds of the commission
members; and (f) administrative review and final decision by either the President or, if
designated, by the Secretary of Defense. Military Order, supra.note 22, § 4(c)(2-8).
44 See DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1, Mar. 21, 2002, supra note 5, at
§ 5A-5P. This order added, among other things, provision for the accused to be furnished a
copy of the charges in advance of trial; a presumption of innocence until proven guilty; a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for findings of guilt; detailing of a defense counsel
before and throughout the trial; a requirement for the prosecution to make evidence available
to the defense which is either exculpatory or which it intends to introduce at trial; formal
acknowledgment that the accused is not required to testify during trial and that no adverse
inference can be drawn from the decision not to testify; the right of the accused to testify in
his own defense, if he so elects; the right of the accused to obtain witnesses and present
evidence; the right to an interpreter; the right of the accused to be present at trial, unless he
engages in disruptive behavior (but his defense counsel may not be excluded); the right to
make a statement and submit evidence before sentencing; a public trial, unless it must be
closed because of classified evidence; and a provision against double jeopardy.
42
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fact that a civilian defense attorney representing an accused before a
commission must be a United States citizen;4 5 there is no "judge" for the
military commission, only a legal officer who serves as part of the panel as
the "presiding officer" and who has limited independent duties; 46 and there
is no provision for judicial review of military commissions. 47 Finally, a
series of nine Military Commission Instructions 48 gives more precise
definition and detail to the procedural rules set out in Military Commission
Order No. 1. Also, the Secretary of Defense has appointed those
responsible for administering the military commission system,49 and the
panel members of the military commission itself have been selected. 0
45 Compare DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1, id, at § 4(C)(3) with
MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
R.C.M. § 502(d)(3)
(2002) available at
http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdfiles/mcm2002.pdf [hereinafter MANUAL]. It is possible that
foreign attorneys, properly credentialed in their own countries, might be allowed to
participate as "consultants" to the defense team, but MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1
would appear to preclude a non-U.S. citizen from actually participating in an active defense
role at the trial.
46 Compare DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1, id, at § 4(A)(1) with
MANUAL, supra note 45 at R.C.M. § 801.
47 Compare DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1, id, at § 6H(4-6) with
MANUAL, supra note 45 at R.C.M. § 1203-1205.
48 DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 1, MILITARY COMMISSION

INSTRUCTIONS, (Apr. 30, 2003); DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 2,
CRIMES AND ELEMENTS FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSION (Apr. 30, 2003); DEP'T OF
DEF.

MILITARY

PROSECUTOR,

COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 3, RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF
DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTOR, PROSECUTOR, AND ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS,

(Apr. 15, 2004); DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 4,
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHIEF DEFENSE COUNSEL, DEPUTY CHIEF DEFENSE COUNSEL,
DETAILED DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND CivILIAN DEFENSE COUNSEL, (Apr. 15, 2004); DEP'T OF
DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 5, QUALIFICATION OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE
COUNSEL, (Apr. 30, 2003); DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 6,
REPORTING RELATIONSHIPS FOR MILITARY COMMISSION PERSONNEL, (Apr. 15, 2004); DEP'T
OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 7, SENTENCING, (Apr. 30, 2003); DEP'T OF
DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION No. 8, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, (Apr. 30,
2003); and DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 9, REvIEw OF MILITARY
COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS, (Dec. 26, 2003); all available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/commissions.html.
49 Retired Army Maj. General John D. Altenburg, Jr., a former Assistant Judge Advocate
General of the United States Army, has replaced Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz as
the Appointing Authority; Retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Hemingway was recalled
to active duty and is the Deputy Appointing Authority as well as Legal Advisor to the
Appointing Authority; Army Col. Robert L. Swann has replaced Army Col. Fred Borch as
the Chief Prosecutor; Air Force Col. Will A. Gunn is the Chief Defense Counsel; and former
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, former Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman,
Jr., Chief Justice Frank J. Williams of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and former Judge of
the Court of Common Pleas (Bucks County, Pennsylvania) Edward G. Biester, Jr., have all
been named as review panel members for military commissions. See DEP'T OF DEF.,
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V. Judicial Review of Commission Proceedings: A Door Left Partially
Open
As previously noted, one of the most criticized aspects of the military
commission system is the lack of any provision for judicial review of
convictions. 5 I That was expressly prohibited by the terms of the Military
Order,5 2 and although such language might be construed as an attempt to
suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus, it could not have that effect in light of
clear Supreme Court precedent.5 Short of that, the Bush administration has
relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's 1950 decision in Eisentrager54 to
argue that there should be no judicial review of the activities at
Guantanamo Bay, be it detention or trial by military commission, because
the Constitution affords no access to our courts to the non-resident aliens
held there. Nonetheless, the Court granted certiorari in the fall of 2003 in a
case filed on behalf of two Australian and twelve Kuwaiti detainees whose
petitions for habeas corpus had been denied.5 5 Notwithstanding the very
limited scope of the grant (to the jurisdictional issue only), it was assumed
that the Court would necessarily have to look at the continued vitality of
Eisentragerin a new context-the "War against Terrorism." It did not. The
Court skirted the constitutional issue by finding a statutory basis for habeas
review which, because of prior case law, did not exist in 1950. Further, it
MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER Nos. 4-6 (Jan.30, 2004, Mar. 15, 2004, Mar. 26, 2004);
Briefing, Department of Defense Background Briefing. (Dec. 1, 2003) (Federal News
Service).
50 The Presiding Officer is retired Army Col. Peter E. Brownbeck, a former Army judge
advocate recalled to active duty for this purpose, with the other panel members being Marine
Col. Jack Sparks, Jr., Marine Col. R. Thomas Bright, Air Force Lt. Col. Timothy Toomey,
and Air Force Col. Christopher Bogdan. Toni Locy, Guantanamo Hearings Start Today,
USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2004, at 4A.
51See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52 "With respect to any individual subject to this order - (1) military tribunals shall have
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the individual; and (2) the individual shall
not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to
have such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the
United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any
international tribunal". DEP'T OF DEF. MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1, supra note 22,

at § 7(b).
53 ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 11 (citing Madsen v. Kinsella, Application of
Yamashita and Ex ParteQuirin).
" Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 775-79, 790-91.
55 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. grantedsub nom; Rasul
v. Bush, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003), granting on the limited question: "[w]hether United States
courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Bay, Cuba."

2004]

ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS

left for later resolution the nature and scope of habeas proceedings in the
lower courts.56 Interestingly, in Rasul, an amicus brief filed by a number of
the military attorneys assigned to defend the detainees before military
commissions urged the court, in what was clearly only a detention issue
case, not to adopt a blanket approach which would preclude a case-by-case
review for those facing commissions. 57 The Court's ruling on purely
statutory grounds left that option open, and a lower court decision
58 last fall
provides a tantalizing hint of the direction the courts may follow.
Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was facing trial by military commission
on charges of conspiracy to commit several war crimes, filed a writ of
habeas corpus challenging the commission's lawfulness. On November 8th
Judge James Robertson of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia ruled that Hamdan's trial could not proceed because the
government had failed to comply with the Third Geneva Convention in
making the determination that Hamdan was not a prisoner of war and that,
since the mechanism under the Convention was not employed, Hamdan was
presumed to be a prisoner of war and could only be prosecuted by a military
court-martial (the same type of criminal trial forum used for our own
servicemen and service women).59
The government appealed Judge Robertson's decision to the Court of
Appeals and Hamdan petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
before judgment, which the Court denied.6 ° Until the DC Circuit Court of
Appeals rules on the government's appeal, the military commissions have
been paused; but regardless of what the Circuit Court does in Hamdan, his
case, or perhaps one to follow, should ultimately reach the Supreme Court.
Will the Court, perhaps against the backdrop of the ongoing national and
international debate over the perceived unfairness of the commissions, take
56
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the opportunity to revisit the constitutionalunderpinnings of Eisentragerin
the context of a commission conviction? If it does, whatever the ruling, it
will have a major impact upon the Administration's strategy for prosecuting
terrorists outside our borders.
VI. Conclusion
Quite apart from criticisms of the charter documents already discussed,
the military commission proceedings, before they were halted by Judge
Robertson, had clearly gotten off to a rocky start, with acknowledged errors
in translation and challenges being made to several of the commission panel
members, including the presiding officer himself.61 With these trials almost
four years in the making, and with the imperative to prove to the world that
we know what we are doing and that the proceedings will be fair, these
initial missteps are, taken in best light, unfortunate. If the courts allow
them to proceed, the commissions will hopefully run more smoothly and be
more widely accepted by the international community. In the final analysis,
though, only history can judge whether we acted prudently in using them
and whether they properly achieved their purpose. That is a verdict we
must await.
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